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ABSTRACT 
Local Bias Among U.S.-based Hedge Funds 
by 
Mikhail Stukalo 
May 2017 
Chair: Dr. Vikas Agarwal 
Major Academic Unit: J. Mack Robinson College of Business 
I examine local bias in hedge fund portfolio selection, using Section 13-F original and 
confidential holding filings. Using Coval and Moskowitz (1999) measure, I find that local bias is 
present among U.S.-based hedge funds. The holdings of funds are on average 20-67 km closer to 
hedge funds than the market. I also find that size and leverage of a company serve as 
determinants of local bias, with the preference of hedge funds for smaller and more levered local 
companies. I suggest an alternative model for assessment of local bias that yields results further 
supporting the hypothesis of the existence of local bias among hedge funds. I do not find a 
positive effect of local bias on performance. Moreover, in some periods I find a strong negative 
effect of local bias both on raw and risk-adjusted returns. I argue that these findings suggest that 
the origins of local bias should not be looked for in information asymmetry, and rather may be 
attributed to perceived informational advantage, flight to familiarity, and some endogenous 
factors of hedge fund locality. 
 
INDEX WORDS: Hedge funds, Local bias, Location, Distance 
 
  
1 
I INTRODUCTION  
Since the late 90s, the hedge fund industry demonstrated substantial growth in assets 
under management (AuM). According to BarclayHedge database1, the total assets under 
management of hedge funds increased from $118 billion in 1997 to over $3 trillion as of the end 
of 2016.  The importance of hedge funds as a large source of alternative returns drew attention of 
both practitioners and academia.    
Academic literature is primarily focused on explanation of hedge fund returns based on 
market risk factors (Fung & Hsieh, 2004; Hasanhodzic & Lo, 2006). However, the decision-
making process of stock selection by hedge funds is relatively uncovered. The notable exceptions 
are papers by Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, and Yang (2013), and Griffin and Xu (2009). The first paper 
looks into evidence provided by confidential stock holding reports about stock selection skills of 
hedge fund managers, and finds that holdings reported under confidentiality clause overperform 
other holdings by the same fund. The second paper compares stock picking skills of hedge fund 
managers to those of mutual fund managers and finds no significant difference between the skills 
of both groups. The key obstacle for the research on decision-making in stock selection by hedge 
funds is the secretive nature of the industry. Hedge funds are less regulated than traditional asset 
managers, and enjoy more relaxed reporting requirements than, for example, mutual funds 
(Agarwal et al., 2013). 
From practitioners’ point of view, hedge funds represent an important class of alternative 
assets. The popularity of hedge funds among large institutional investors, e.g. pension funds, 
endowments, etc., is based on a promise of delivering returns that have low correlation with the 
broader market. Therefore, hedge fund investments are expected to provide return diversification 
                                                 
1 https://www.barclayhedge.com/research/indices/ghs/mum/Hedge_Fund.html 
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for institutional investors. I argue that the location of a hedge fund can introduce a source of 
under-diversification as it pertains to locality-specific risks. To illustrate this argument, let us 
suppose that Coca Cola2 invests a large part of its pension plan’s hedge fund allocation in 
Georgia-based hedge funds. If, in turn, Georgian hedge funds exhibit local bias, then regional-
specific adverse events, e.g. natural disasters, change in local taxation regime, or economic 
downturns on regional level, may lead not only to an increase of Coca Cola pension plan 
liabilities due to financial stress to the company, but simultaneously to a deterioration of pension 
plan assets. Both the plan sponsor and the plan investments will be exposed to the same regional 
risk.  
In this paper, I analyze local bias among U.S. hedge funds defined as a preference for 
stocks of companies located in geographic proximity to a fund. From existing academic literature 
we know that local bias is present among different groups of investors: individual investors 
(Ivković & Weisbenner, 2005; Seasholes & Zhu, 2010), institutional investors (Baik, Kang, & 
Kim, 2010), mutual funds (Coval & Moskowitz, 1999), and fund of funds  (Sialm, Sun, & 
Zheng, 2014). However, there are no published papers that provide evidence of existence or 
absence of local bias in the hedge fund industry.  
Moreover, there is no consensus in academia on the effect of local bias on performance. 
For instance, while Coval and Moskowitz (2001) and Baik et al. (2010) find positive effect of 
local bias on performance, Seasholes and Zhu (2010) argue that local bias does not lead to better 
performance. Shiller, Kon-Ya, and Tsutsui (1991) report negative effect of home bias on 
portfolio performance as a result of under-diversification.   
                                                 
2 According to Coca Cola 10-K filings for 2016 financial year, over $1.1 billion of  $6 billion pension plan is 
invested in hedge funds (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/21344/000002134417000009/a2016123110-
k.htm p.114) 
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My study is aimed at bridging the gap in academic literature by providing the evidence 
for existence of local bias among hedge funds, more specifically, U.S.-based hedge funds. I 
assess local bias in hedge fund portfolio selection using Coval and Moskowitz (1999) local bias 
measure. Also, I propose an alternative model of local bias that relies on comparison of 
divergence of stock portfolio weights in hedge fund portfolios from the weight of the same stock 
in portfolios of their peers. Both approaches provide robust evidence of the existence of local 
bias in hedge fund industry. Moreover, using Coval and Moskowitz (1999) measure, I analyze 
determinants of local bias, and come to the conclusion that consistent with Coval and Moskowitz 
hypothesis,  hedge funds are more likely to exhibit local bias when investing in smaller stocks 
and stocks of companies that have higher level of leverage. 
Next, I analyze performance of long equity portfolios sub-divided based on geographical 
proximity to a hedge fund. I do not find any positive effect of holding local portfolios on hedge 
fund performance, either raw or risk-adjusted. These results contradict findings of Coval and 
Moskowitz (2001). As a plausible explanation that needs to be thoroughly explored in further 
research, I suggest the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure that was adopted in 2000, i.e. much 
later than the sample used in Coval and Moskowitz paper. Fair and simultaneous dissemination 
of material information may have changed the level of information asymmetry and done away 
with excess return associated with investments into local companies. 
Finally, I suggest several plausible hypotheses of the causes of local bias. I argue that 
based on the results of my research the most plausible explanations are an endogenous nature of 
local bias linked to the industrial clustering in the U.S., and perceived informational advantage 
that does not generate excess returns in local stock portfolios, but creates a sense of familiarity of 
the target companies. 
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II LITERATURE REVIEW 
Local bias is a part of a larger concept, “home bias puzzle”, defined as preference for 
domestic stocks over foreign stocks. In their seminal work, French and Poterba (1991) find that 
98% of equity portfolios of Japanese investors, 94% of U.S. investors’ portfolios and  82% of 
British portfolios are held in domestics stocks. The proposed explanations included arguments of 
more favorable trading terms for domestic investors, e.g. taxes (Black, 1974), capital flow 
barriers (Stulz, 1981), and trade and transportation costs (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 2000).  However, 
Tesar and Werner (1995) did not find empirical evidence of the effect of transaction costs on 
home bias. Another branch of literature that suggested plausible explanations for home bias 
argues that the source of the bias is an information asymmetry. For example, S. Orpurt (2002) 
finds that German research analysts predict earnings of domestic firms better than their foreign 
peers. In hedge fund research, Teo (2009) finds that funds investing in Asian stocks perform 
better if they have regional presence, either via headquarters or a local research office, than funds 
without an Asian presence. He also attributes this advantage to informational asymmetries. 
Local bias is well documented among individual investors. Seasholes and Zhu (2010) 
find that in the period of 1991-1995 around 30% of stock holdings of households were stocks of 
companies located within 250 miles from the household. Similar results for the share of the local 
stocks in households’ portfolios (31%) are obtained by Ivković and Weisbenner (2005). 
However, the views on the effect of local bias on portfolio performance are contradictory 
between the papers. Seasholes and Zhu (2010) claim that performance of local stocks in 
households’ portfolios does not differ from performance of more distant stocks in the same 
portfolio. Ivković and Weisbenner (2005), on the other hand, find that local constituents of the 
portfolios overperform more distant stocks by 3.2% on average. They also suggest that returns 
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are higher for local stocks that have some information asymmetries as evidenced by higher 
returns of stocks not included in S&P 500 index.     
In the research of institutional money managers, local bias is reported by Baik et al. 
(2010). The authors analyze institutional holdings of local companies, i.e. what percentage of 
shares outstanding of a company is held by local institutional investors. They find that on 
average 3.2% of shares of companies are held by local institutional investors, defined as same-
state managers. They also discover that when aggregated at manager’s level, on average 8.2% of 
portfolio holdings of institutional investors is represented by a local firm. Moreover, this fraction 
differs for various types of institutional investors. Investment advisors have on average 10.3% of 
portfolio invested in local stocks, while for mutual funds this fraction is 8.2%. Furthermore, Baik 
et al. (2010) provide evidence that stocks that local institutional investors hold or trade earn 
higher excess returns around future earnings announcement dates than  stocks held or traded by 
non-local institutional investors, suggesting an informational advantage of local investors.  
In mutual funds, local bias is described in a seminal paper by Coval and Moskowitz 
(1999). They find that mutual funds in their cross-sectional analysis, invest in companies that are 
on average 160-184 kilometers closer to funds than the benchmark. In the follow-up paper, 
Coval and Moskowitz (2001) define local mutual funds as the ones that are located within 100 
km from a firm, and find that local investments overperform more distant investments by on 
average 118 basis points per year after controlling for size, value and momentum factors.  This 
allows the authors to suggest that local mutual funds possess superior information on local firms. 
However, it should be noted that the paper uses a sample of mutual fund returns for the period 
between 1975 and 1994. Therefore, the conclusions may be not relevant in the view of the 
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Regulation Fair Disclosure, adopted in August 2000 and requiring all publicly traded companies 
to disseminate material information to all investors simultaneously.  
  Finally, in the hedge fund field of studies, Sialm et al. (2014) documented local bias 
among funds of funds (FoF). From that perspective, local bias is defined as the difference 
between weights of local hedge funds3 and non-local funds in the hedge fund portfolios of FoFs. 
The authors report that the local fund of funds overweigh local hedge funds by 15%. They find 
that local bias increases both raw and risk-adjusted performance of FoFs. For example, average 
return increases by 115 basis points for each unit of standard deviation of the local bias measure 
for a certain MSA.  However, the authors also argue that local bias creates a local contagion 
effect when adverse events may be experienced by a large share of FoF’s portfolio funds due to 
geographical crowding.  
While local bias is well documented in various fields of research, its effect on 
performance is still a topic for discussion. As mentioned previously some authors (Baik et al., 
2010; Coval & Moskowitz, 2001; Ivković & Weisbenner, 2005; Sialm et al., 2014) find positive 
effect of local bias on raw and risk-adjusted performance. These authors suggest that the excess 
return is earned due to information asymmetries. This point of view is also supported by the 
research on prediction accuracy by local analysts. For example, Malloy (2005) finds that 
geographically proximate U.S.  analysts possess more information about local companies than 
analysts located further from firms.  S. F. Orpurt (2004) finds higher prediction accuracy among 
local analysts in Europe, and Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) makes similar observations for local 
analysts in 32 non-U.S. countries. Another plausible explanation of higher returns on local 
                                                 
3 Sialm et al. (2014) calculate weights from returns of FoFs and the hedge funds they hold, assuming that the return 
of a FoF can be viewed as a return of a portfolio of hedge funds. Locality is determined by location in the same 
administrative area (MSA). 
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investments is a better connection between local institutional investors and firms. Gaspar and 
Massa (2007) find that companies with higher ownership by local mutual funds have better 
corporate governance and shareholder protection policies. Kang and Kim (2008) provide 
evidence that block acquirers exhibit a strong preference for local firms, and are more likely to 
participate in post-acquisition activities than non-local investors. On the other hand, as 
mentioned earlier Seasholes and Zhu (2010) do not find positive influence of local bias on 
returns of individual investors. Shiller et al. (1991) analyze U.S. and Japanese investors behavior 
and conclude that home bias leads to under-diversification and overconfidence bias.  Pool, 
Stoffman, and Yonker (2012) find that mutual fund managers that invest in companies in their 
home state (the state where they were born or raised) do not earn higher returns from these 
investments compared to investments in other states. However, they find that when home state 
and the state of the mutual fund location are the same, local investments generate higher raw and 
risk adjusted returns.         
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III DATA SOURCES AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
III.1 Data Sources 
The data on hedge fund portfolio holdings comes from Form 13F filings of institutional 
investment managers to SEC according to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 13(f). 
This act requires all institutions that have discretion over assets exceeding $100 million to report 
their holdings of Section 13(f) securities. These listed securities cover a large universe of U.S. 
traded stocks and some options on stocks. Therefore, from Form 13F we can learn about long 
position of institutional investors in most traded stocks of the U.S. issuers and some ADRs of 
foreign companies that are traded on U.S. stock exchanges. Institutional investors are required to 
report under Section 13(f) on quarterly basis.  
In existing body of knowledge on local bias among institutional investors (e.g. Baik et al. 
(2010)), authors use Thomson Reuters Database as a primary source of data on institutional 
holdings. However, Thomson Reuters does not fully report hedge fund holdings.  This argument 
comes from the fact that despite the requirement to report quarter-end holdings within 45 days 
after the end of the corresponding quarter, many hedge funds choose to use an exception to this 
rule that allows deferring disclosure of holdings by up to one year from the end of the mandatory 
45-day period.   According to Agarwal et al. (2013), 90% of confidential holdings of hedge funds 
in their sample were not reported by Thomson Reuters. Moreover, they find that on average over 
one-third of the total portfolio value of the hedge funds in their sample is reported in confidential 
filings. Often these positions represent stocks with a higher level of information asymmetry, and 
thus especially interesting for the analysis of local bias.  
Another flaw of Thomson Reuters database, when it comes to hedge fund holdings, arises 
from vague classification of hedge funds in the database. Some hedge funds are reported by 
Thomson Reuters as Type 4 (“independent investment advisors”) entities, while a majority of 
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hedge funds are classified as Type 5 (“others”). According to Thomson Reuters classification, 
the category “others” also includes pension funds, endowment funds, etc. As a result, this all-
encompassing category becomes the largest category in the database, and significantly 
encumbers the analysis of hedge funds using Thomson Reuters database. 
In order to address the aforementioned flaws, I use the updated database from Agarwal et 
al. (2013)4. The database includes original and confidential Form 13F filings of 1,419 hedge 
funds from 1999 to 2012. From SEC EDGAR website, I obtain unique postal addresses of the 
hedge funds in the sample5 . 
According to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 13(f), foreign institutional 
investment managers that hold more than $100 million worth of Section 13(f) securities are 
required to report their holdings to the SEC. However, this requirement covers only the U.S. 
traded securities. Therefore, assuming that the main investment focus of foreign investment 
managers may be outside of the U.S., I restrict my analysis only to U.S.-based hedge funds. After 
excluding hedge funds with foreign postal addresses and investment managers that have a 
majority of business in traditional asset management as opposed to hedge fund business, the 
resulting database contains quarterly holdings of 1,173 U.S.-based hedge funds. Following Coval 
and Moskowitz (1999), I exclude one fund from my sample that is located in Alaska. Therefore, 
the resulting sample consists of 1,172 funds. 
Although Section 13(f) securities contain some of the options on the U.S. stocks, I restrict 
my analysis only to stocks. First, the list of Section 13(f) derivatives does not represent the 
                                                 
4 I am grateful to Dr. Vikas Agarwal and Hoglin Ren for providing access to the database 
 
5 The addresses were obtained from http://www.edgarcompany.sec.gov/servlet/CompanyDBSearch?page=main  In 
the cases where fund addresses were missing, I searched for the address via Google search. 
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majority of the universe of structured products that hedge funds may use to express their 
investment views. Second, the reporting does not include the strike price and the expiration date 
of the option contracts. Therefore, it is impossible to calculate neither the portfolio weight nor 
the return of the option holdings. Finally, combining option contracts and stocks would be 
inaccurate, as by the nature of the option contract, the holder of the contract may choose not to 
exercise it foregoing the paid premium for the option. Whereas holding stocks in the portfolio 
creates an exposure to the stock price movements for the whole invested amount. I also exclude 
ADRs of non-U.S. companies from the sample of portfolio companies. The first reason for that is 
the scope of my research. I analyze local bias manifestation within the country, not a general 
home bias effect. The second reason is the fact that U.S. hedge funds are not required to report 
their holdings in non-U.S. stocks that are acquired on foreign stock exchanges. Therefore, 
inclusion of ADRs would bias the sample of foreign stock holdings. Further, to eliminate the 
possible effect of outliers and following Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Pool et al. (2012), I 
exclude stock of companies located in Hawaii and Puerto Rico. 
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
From CRSP database, I obtain postal addresses for all portfolio companies in the sample. 
Through Google Maps application program interface (API), I collect geographical coordinates 
(latitude and longitude) of hedge funds and their portfolio companies. 
The geography of U.S. hedge funds demonstrate a pronounced clustering around large 
financial centers: New York, San Francisco, Boston, Chicago, etc. This fact can be explained by 
both easier access to capital and better access to talent that hedge funds can enjoy in larger and 
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more economically developed regions. In my sample, 43% of hedge funds are located in the state 
of New York, 14% in California and 9% in Connecticut.  Some states are clearly unpopulated 
when it comes to the investment advisers targeting absolute return. For example, the only fund 
from Vermont in my sample is Champlain Investment Partners. The firm has over 20 years of 
experience, over $7.5 billion dollars under management, and focuses on mid- and small-cap 
investments in value stocks. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Finally, from CRSP database I obtain information on prices as of the month end 
(PRCCM), monthly total return (TRT1M), number of shares outstanding at the end of a quarter 
(CSHOQ), as well as quarterly data for calculation of book value of shareholders’ equity:  
Shareholders' Equity – Total (SEQQ), Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax Credit (TXDITCQ), 
and Preferred/Preference Stock (Capital) – Total (PSTKQ). Fundamental and price data are 
matched with the sample using unique company identifiers in CRSP (LPERMNO). 
III.2 Variable construction 
In this paper, I use two alternative measures of local bias. The first measure (LB) is 
analogous to the one by Coval and Moskowitz (1999). I calculate weights of stocks in hedge 
fund portfolios and compare them to the market weights. Market weight is calculated as the share 
of a company’s market capitalization in the total market capitalization of all CRSP stocks for the 
quarter. The difference between the market weight and the actual weight is scaled by the ratio of 
the distance from the fund to the portfolio company, and the market cap weighted mean distance 
from the fund to all companies in CRSP database:  
  
 
 
12 
𝐿𝐵𝑓,𝑡
𝑖 = (𝑊𝑀,𝑡
𝑖 −  𝑊𝑓,𝑡
𝑖 )
𝐷𝑓,𝑡
𝑖
𝐷𝑓,𝑡
𝑀  
                                                                (1) 
where  
𝐿𝐵𝑓,𝑡
𝑖  is the local bias measure for stock i in portfolio of fund f in time t 
𝑊𝑀,𝑡
𝑖  is the market weight of stock i in portfolio in time t 
𝑊𝑓,𝑡
𝑖   is the weight of stock i in portfolio of fund f in time t 
𝐷𝑓
𝑖      is the distance between fund f and company i 
𝐷𝑓,𝑡
𝑀   is the market cap weighted mean distance between fund f and all companies in 
CRSP database 
 
The alternative local bias measure is based on the assumption that hedge funds, unlike 
mutual funds, usually do not track any certain benchmarks when making investment decisions, 
but rather represent a class of assets known as ‘absolute return’. Even in cases of the so-called 
‘closet indexing,’ where a hedge fund allocates a substantial portion of its portfolio to the assets 
that have high exposure to the broader market risks, the severity of the ‘closet indexing,’ as well 
as the composition of the tracked market indices may significantly differ from fund to fund. I 
argue that despite known biases inherent for this approach (Fung and Hsieh (2004)), a more 
economically significant way to define the local bias among hedge funds is as a divergence of a 
stock weight in a fund’s portfolio from the average weight of the same stock in portfolios of 
others funds. This measure (Delta Weight, ∆𝑊𝑓,𝑡
𝑖 ) is similar to the one used by Pool et al. (2012). 
From this point of view, we can conclude that there is a local bias if there is a negative relation 
between the difference in weights of local stocks compared to the average weights in the sample, 
and the distance between the funds’ and the portfolio companies’ headquarters.  
Another significant difference of the approach taken in my paper from the methodology 
used by some other authors (e.g. Baik et al. (2010)), is that I avoid using states as qualifiers for 
the locality of the holdings. From Figure 1 we can see that although hedge funds are clustered 
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around large cities, this clustering is not necessarily defined by state borders. For example, some 
funds that are located in Connecticut or New Jersey may be much closer to companies located in 
New York city than some funds from the state of New York. Moreover, portfolio companies in 
Iowa are much closer, and hence can be viewed as ‘more local,’ to funds in Illinois than to funds 
in California. Taking the aforementioned considerations into account, I calculate the divergence 
of funds’ holdings from the average weight in the sample as: 
∆𝑊𝑓,𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑊𝑓,𝑡
𝑖  - ?̅?𝑥𝑓,𝑡
𝑖   ,                                                                (2) 
 
where  
∆𝑊𝑓,𝑡
𝑖  is the divergence of the weight of stock i in portfolio of fund f in time t 
𝑊𝑓,𝑡
𝑖  is the weight of stock i in portfolio of fund f in time t 
?̅?𝑥𝑓,𝑡
𝑖  is the average weight of stock i in time t in portfolios of all funds in the sample that 
hold stock i, except fund f, calculated as: 
 ?̅?𝑥𝑓,𝑡
𝑖 =
∑ 𝑊𝑡
𝑖− 𝑊𝑓,𝑡
𝑖
𝑁−1
, if N>1 
?̅?𝑥𝑓,𝑡
𝑖 = 0, if N=1 
 
Some funds in the sample invest substantial portions of their portfolios in exchange 
traded funds (ETFs) and mutual funds, which can be viewed as a type of ‘closet indexing’. I 
argue that investments in ETFs cannot be considered as expression of existence or absence of the 
local bias. Therefore, I use values of investments in ETFs and mutual funds for calculation of 
portfolio weights, but then exclude these investments from the analysis of the effect of the 
distance on the over- or underweighting of stocks in hedge fund portfolios. 
Using geographical coordinates of the hedge funds and their portfolio companies in the 
sample, I calculate distances between each fund and each company in its portfolio. The distances 
are calculated between the head offices of funds and portfolio companies. Some funds may have 
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several offices in different parts of the country. In addition, there are companies, especially the 
large ones, that have numerous production and distribution facilities not only in the U.S., but also 
abroad. However, I choose to restrict the calculation of distances to distances between 
headquarters following Baik et al. (2010) approach and taking into account findings of Kang and 
Kim (2008), who conclude that headquarters provide critical decision-making information to 
investors, while branches and divisions do not.  
Coval and Moskowitz (1999) report the distance measure formula that does not correctly 
account for the spherical shape of the Earth. As the result, using this formula, calculations of 
short distances roughly correspond to real distances between geographical locations. However, 
for longer distances, e.g. over 100 km, the Coval and Moskowitz (1999) distance measure 
formula produces significant errors (see Appendix A).  Following Alam, Chen, Ciccotello, and 
Ryan (2014), I calculate distance between a hedge fund and a portfolio company using spherical 
law of cosines as: 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑓,𝑖  =  𝑟 × arccos  [sin(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑓) sin(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖) + cos(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑓) cos(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖) cos(𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑓 − 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑖)]  
 
                                       (3) 
where 
f ,  i denote a fund and a portfolio company respectively 
long, lat  - longitudes and latitude  respectively (measured in radian)s; 
r - radius. For calculation of distance between geographical coordinates, the radius of 
the Earth ≈6,378km. 
 
 
 
I use Size, Book-to-Market, Momentum, and Leverage as control variables in my model 
to assess influence of the market capitalization and value characteristics on the divergence of 
portfolio weights, as well as to analyze the determinants of local bias. I calculate Size as a 
natural logarithm of Market Capitalization. Market Capitalization, in turn, is calculated as a 
product of the stock price at the end of the quarter and the number of shares outstanding. 
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Momentum is calculated as cumulative return for 4 quarters preceding the quarter of observation. 
Leverage is calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets of the company.  I calculate Book-
to-Market using the following approach: 
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 =  
SEQQ +  TXDITCQ − PSTKQ
CSHOQ 
PRCCQ 
                              (4) 
where  
SEQQ - shareholders' equity; 
TXDITCQ - deferred taxes and investment tax credit; 
PSTKQ - preferred stock (Capital); 
CSHOQ - shares outstanding at the end of the quarter; 
PRCCQ – closing price at the end of the quarter. 
 
All data for Size, Momentum, Leverage, and Book-to-Market calculations is obtained 
from CRSP database, Fundamentals Quarterly. 
I also calculate end of the quarter Portfolio of each fund as the sum of products of the 
number of shares and the closing price at the end of the quarter for each stock in a hedge fund’s 
portfolio. It should be noted that the disclosure standards require funds to report only long 
positions in listed Section 13(f) securities. Also, as stated above, I restrict my analysis only to 
stocks, hence excluding long option positions. Therefore, Portfolio represents solely the total 
value of the long equity positions of a fund. 
 
[Insert Table 2]  
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IV LOCAL BIAS IN HEDGE FUND PORTFOLIO SELECTION 
IV.1 Presence of local bias in hedge funds 
I start my analysis by comparing weights of stocks in hedge fund portfolios with the 
market weights of these stocks. The analysis is analogous to the one performed by Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999) with the exception that they used cross-sectional data in their paper, while I 
use the full longitudinal sample for the period 1999-2012. Distances from the funds to market 
portfolios are calculated in two different ways: as an arithmetic mean of distances, and as a mean 
weighted by market capitalizations of companies in a certain quarter. Then I compute mean 
distances from funds to all of its portfolio companies. This measure within a fund is calculated as 
weighted by values of the long equity positions both for Equal and Value case. On funds level I 
perform aggregation using equal weights for Equal scenario and weighted by long equity 
portfolio size for Value option. This way I obtain measures similar to  Coval and Moskowitz 
(1999) Equal-Equal, Equal-Value, etc. Finally, I calculate mean distance across several 
observation quarters. Hence, the formulae for the local bias measures look as follows: 
𝐿𝐵(𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 − 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙)                                                     
=
1
𝑇𝐹𝐼
 ∑ ∑
∑ (𝐷𝑓,𝑡 
𝑖  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡
𝑖𝐼
𝑖=1 )
∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡
𝑖𝐼
𝑖=1
𝐹
𝑓=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
                                                                       
− 
1
𝑇𝐹𝑀
 ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝐷𝑓,𝑡 
𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
𝐹
𝑓=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
 
(5) 
𝐿𝐵(𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙)
=
1
𝑇
 ∑
∑ (
∑ (𝐷𝑓,𝑡 
𝑖  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐼𝑖=1
𝑖
)
∑ (𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐼𝑖=1
𝑖
)
𝐹
𝑓=1   𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑓,𝑡)
∑ (𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑓
𝐹
𝑓=1 , 𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
−  
1
𝑇
 ∑
∑ ((
1
𝑀
∑ 𝐷𝑓,𝑡
𝑚 )𝑀𝑚=1
𝐹
𝑓=1   𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑓,𝑡)
∑ (𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑓
𝐹
𝑓=1 , 𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
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𝐿𝐵(𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 − 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)                                           
=
1
𝑇𝐹𝐼
 ∑ ∑
∑ (𝐷𝑓,𝑡 
𝑖  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡
𝑖𝐼
𝑖=1 )
∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡
𝑖𝐼
𝑖=1
𝐹
𝑓=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
                                        
−  
1
𝑇𝐹
 ∑ ∑
∑ (𝐷𝑓,𝑡 
𝑚  𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡
𝑚𝑀
𝑚=1 )
∑ (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡
𝑚)𝑚𝑚=1
𝐹
𝑓=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
 
 
 
𝐿𝐵(𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)
=
1
𝑇
 ∑
∑ (
∑ (𝐷𝑓,𝑡 
𝑖  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐼𝑖=1
𝑖
)
∑ (𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐼𝑖=1
𝑖
)
𝐹
𝑓=1   𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑓,𝑡)
∑ (𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑓
𝐹
𝑓=1 , 𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
−  
1
𝑇
 ∑
∑ (
∑ (𝐷𝑓,𝑡 
𝑚  𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡
𝑚𝑀
𝑚=1 )
∑ (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑡
𝑚)𝑚𝑚=1
𝐹
𝑓=1   𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑓,𝑡)
∑ (𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑓
𝐹
𝑓=1 , 𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
 
Coval and Moskowitz (1999) found that on average mutual funds in 1995 were closer to 
their holdings than to the market by 160-184 kilometers. However, as stated above, I argue that 
their distance measure yields inaccurate outcomes. My results provide evidence that hedge funds 
also exhibit local preference, investing in holdings that are on average 20-67 kilometers closer to 
them than the market. For non-NY based funds this number is higher: 40-92 kilometers. These 
results are statistically significant, with t-statistics for all cases high enough to soundly reject null 
hypothesis of the absence of the local bias.  
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
Besides using different distance measure, my analysis differs from Coval and Moskowitz 
(1999) in another important aspect. In their 1999 paper, Coval and Moskowitz used a cross-
sectional analysis for the data coming from 1995. The degree of the local bias can change with 
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time. This point of view is supported by the dynamics of local bias measure in percents as in 
Table 3 plotted for various years in my sample. Interestingly, local bias drops in 2001-2002, 
which coincides with the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure. It increases sharply in 2008, 
during the financial crises, which may indicate flight to more familiar, local companies in the 
times of distress.  
 
[Insert Figure 2] 
 
IV.2 Determinants of local bias 
Next, I test the hypothesis suggested by Coval and Moskowitz (1999) that the size and 
the leverage of portfolio companies affect local bias. Following Coval and Moskowitz, I 
calculate local bias measure using equation (1). Size is defined as natural logarithm of Market 
Capitalization. Leverage is calculated using quarterly data from CRSP database, and defined as 
the ratio of total liabilities to total assets of a portfolio company. I perform a linear regression 
analysis, where the dependent variable is LB measure from equation (1). To account for 
autocorrelation of the local bias measure I include lagged local bias as one of the independent 
variables. The regression has the form of: 
𝐿𝐵𝑓,𝑡
𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐿𝐵𝑓,𝑡−1
𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡
𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡
𝑖 + 𝜀𝑓,𝑡
𝑖                           (6) 
The results of the regression analysis and standard errors of the coefficient (clustered on 
stock-fund and quarter level) are reported in Table 4. The signs of the regression coefficients are 
consistent with findings of Coval and Moskowitz (1999). Negative regression coefficient of Size 
suggests that smaller portfolio companies are located closer to hedge funds. However, when I 
exclude New York based funds, Size coefficient ceases to be statistically significant. I conclude 
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that New York-based funds exhibit preference for smaller local stock. Both New York-based 
funds and funds from other states exhibit strong and statistically significant preference for local 
stocks with higher leverage.  The results of the analysis suggest that the hypothesis of the 
information asymmetry, whether perceived or real, is plausible. Smaller companies with high 
leverage are associated with higher risk, lower transparency, and higher probability of financial 
distress. By investing in such companies, hedge funds may count on informational advantage 
arising from less transparency of portfolio companies.  
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
IV.3 Alternative specification of the local bias 
The Coval and Moskowitz (1999) approach to measuring local bias implies comparison 
between the actual holdings of funds and the market portfolio. However, hedge funds are 
notorious for holding concentrated stocks positions. In my sample, an average fund-quarter 
observation contains 106 stock names (compared to 5,943 stocks in market portfolio). Therefore, 
I suggest using an alternative measure as defined in equation (2) that compares weights of stocks 
in a hedge fund portfolio to the mean weight of the same stock in portfolios of other funds in a 
sample (Delta Weight).  
I examine the difference in Delta Weights of stocks in funds’ portfolios for various 
buckets of distance. Instead of using quintiles for defining the buckets, I opted for a more 
practical and economically sensible definition based on proximity. I divide stocks into the 
following groups based on the distance from a hedge fund: 0 to 100 kilometers, 100 to 500 
kilometers, 500 to 1,000 kilometers, 1,000 to 3,000 kilometers, and over 3,000 kilometers. The 
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practical reasoning of this division comes from the assumption that companies located within 
100 kilometers from a fund can be view as local: the travel is short enough to be made by car, 
hedge fund managers and top-management of companies are likely to share the same social 
circles. The 500-km cut-off represents a distance typical for companies located in nearby states. 
The 1,000-km limit covers companies in the same geographical region, e.g. North-East of the 
U.S., while the distance of 3,000 km  is approximately the distance from East to West Coast of 
the United States (see Appendix B).  
Next, I calculate mean Delta Weight for each distance group in the sample. 
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
The results of the sorting suggest a strong preference of hedge funds for local companies, 
located within 100 kilometers from a hedge fund, which is in line with findings of Coval and 
Moskowitz (2001). Furthermore, mean Delta Weight decreases with every next bucket of 
distance, suggesting negative effect of Distance on Delta Weight.  
I use ANOVA test to assess statistical significance of the difference in mean Delta 
Weights.  Bartlett test of homogeneity of variances results in K-squared = 52617, df = 3, p-value 
< 0.0001. Fligner-Killeen test of homogeneity of variances produces Chi-squared = 4560.7, df = 
3, p-value < 0.0001. Hence, I conclude that the variances of observations among groups are 
homogeneous, and I can perform ANOVA test of mean differences. From the test, I conclude 
that there is a statistically significant difference in means of Delta Weight among Distance 
groups. 
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[Insert Table 6] 
 
I analyze difference in means among particular groups using Tukey HSD test. To address 
the possible issue with heteroskedasticity of the observations, I augment the test with standard 
errors clustered on a stock-fund and a quarter level and corresponding p-values.  From Tukey 
HSD test I observe the statistical significance of difference in mean Delta Weight for the first 
distance group (0 to 100 kilometers) and all other groups. Also, there is a statistically significant 
difference between means for second group (100 to 500 kilometers) and the most distant group 
(1,000 to 4,500 kilometers). For other groups, I cannot conclude that the difference is statistically 
significant.  
 
[Insert Table 7] 
 
The result of the sorting analysis support the hypothesis of the existence of the local bias 
among hedge funds in portfolio selection. The economic implication of the sorting analysis is a 
strong presence of the local bias for companies, located in the closest proximity from a hedge 
fund (0 to 100 kilometers), compared to more distant companies.  
 
IV.4 Linear model of distance effect on stock weight divergence  
I begin my regression analysis of the dependence of Delta Weight on Distance from 
considering a linear regression approach. My weight divergence measure, Delta Weight, is 
relative in its nature, as it represents the difference between the weight of a stock in a fund’s 
portfolio and the mean weight of the same stock in portfolios of all other funds in my sample. 
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Therefore, for the regression analysis I transform the distance measure into a relative measure as 
𝐷𝑓,𝑡
𝑖
?̅?𝑥𝑓,𝑡
𝑖 , where D stands for “distance” measured in kilometers, and the subscripts correspond to 
subscripts in equation (2). To address a strongly convex shape of the fitted function describing 
the relationship between the distance measure and Delta Weight, I further transform the distance 
measure by taking a natural logarithm. 
I also introduce control variables to the regression. As a proxy for value vs. growth 
strategies, I use Book-to-Market (BM) ratio of the portfolio companies. I also control for the Size 
of portfolio companies, and for Momentum factor, defined as cumulative return in four preceding 
quarters. Delta Weight exhibits autocorrelation. To reflect this property of Delta Weight, I 
include lagged variable into the regression equation.  The final model of the linear regression has 
the following formulation:   
     
∆𝑊𝑓,𝑡
𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1log (𝐷𝑓,𝑡
𝑖 /𝐷𝑥𝑓,𝑡
𝑖 ) +  𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡
𝑖 +  𝛽3𝐵𝑀𝑡
𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑡
𝑖 + 𝛽5∆𝑊𝑓,𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝜀 𝑓,𝑡
𝑖          
(7) 
 
The regression results are presented in Table 8. Column 1 contains the outcomes of linear 
regression (7) applied to the full sample of stocks in the database. Column 2 reports regression 
results for the set of 1,000 largest capitalization stocks in CRSP database. The latter analysis 
works as a robustness check in the view of the fact that some stocks that funds hold in their 
portfolio can be described as ‘unpopular’, meaning that only a small number of funds hold them.  
 
[Insert Table 8] 
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The OLS regression shows negative relationship between the distance measure and Delta 
Weight. In other words, the closer a company located to a hedge fund, the larger is the difference 
between the weight of this stock in the fund’s portfolio compared to the mean weight of this 
stock in the portfolios of other hedge funds that hold the same stock.  More specifically, every 
standard deviation of the distance ratio increases Delta Weight by on average 0.0134 percent, 
which is also economically significant given the average Delta Weight in the sample of 0.007 
percent. The regression also gives an insight into the characteristics of portfolio companies of 
hedge funds. Regression coefficients indicate that hedge funds on average favor larger 
capitalization, value stocks.        
Next I perform the same linear regression analysis for two sets of sub-samples. I divide 
observations based on the size of Portfolio. First sub-sample contains observations where the 
size of fund Portfolio is larger than the median Portfolio for that quarter.  The second sub-sample 
contains Portfolios smaller or equal to the quarter median. The results presented in Table 
9suggest that the local bias effect is stronger for smaller portfolios than for larger ones. I suggest 
two plausible explanations for this effect. First, smaller Portfolios can be more heavily invested 
in smaller companies without experiencing liquidity constrains. It is also supported by stronger 
negative effect of Size on Delta Weight in portfolios below median. The ability to invest in 
smaller companies, in turn, expands the universe of potential investment targets and allows 
expressing local bias by investing in local small-caps. The second plausible explanation is that 
smaller Portfolios are more likely to be more concentrated, which is represented by higher 
intercept term for the sub-sample of smaller Portfolios. Higher concentration, and hence lower 
diversification of the portfolio, may lead to investing more heavily into ‘familiar’ companies, 
catalyzing the local bias.     
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[Insert Table 9] 
 
IV.5 Piecewise regression analysis 
I further develop the linear model by considering a piecewise regression. First, I fit a 
generalized additive model and plot the fitted function (Figure 3). Visual inspection shows that 
the slope of the fitted line changes around Log(Dif,t/D
i
xf,t) = 0. I use zero as a breakpoint for the 
piecewise regression. The choice of zero as a breakpoint also has a practical sense, as it 
distinguishes between portfolio companies that are located closer to the fund of observation than 
on average to other funds in the sample and the companies that are located further away.  
 
[Insert Figure 3] 
 
The regression includes the same control variables as regression (7) and has the form of: 
 
∆𝑊𝑓,𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1log (
𝐷𝑓,𝑡
𝑖
𝐷𝑥𝑓,𝑡
𝑖 ) + 𝛽2max (log (
𝐷𝑓,𝑡
𝑖
𝐷𝑥𝑓,𝑡
𝑖 ) − 0,0) +  ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
5
𝑛=3 + 𝛽6∆𝑊𝑓,𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝜀 𝑓,𝑡
𝑖      
(8) 
The results of the regression analysis provide further evidence for the existence of local 
bias. The negative slope of the regression coefficient declines further by -0.0185, when 
Log(Dif,t/D
i
xf,t) is below zero, i.e. when the portfolio company is closer to the fund than on 
average to other funds. In this case, a decrease by one standard deviation of the relative distance 
measure increases stock weight divergence, Delta Weight, by 0.0289% compared to the increase 
by 0.0104% when the stock is further from the fund than from other funds on average.  For the 
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robustness check, I perform the regression analysis on the sub-sample of 1,000 largest 
capitalization stocks for each quarter in CRSP database. The regression yields similar results. 
[Insert Table 10] 
 
IV.6 Effect of local bias on portfolio performance 
I explore the effect of local bias on performance of hedge fund holdings by constructing a 
local and a distant portfolio for each fund. The portfolio construction follows Coval and 
Moskowitz (2001). I define local portfolio as a portfolio of companies located within 100 km 
from a hedge fund. For each distance portfolio, I recalculate the weight of stocks by scaling 
actual weights by the weight of the local portfolio in the total Portfolio of the fund. Hence, the 
weights of stocks in each portfolio sum up to one. For example, if a hedge fund invests 40% 
equally in four local stocks, each stock will have 25% in the local portfolio. 
I assume that funds hold the same weights of stocks in the next three months after the 
report date. Therefore, the assumption is that the reported number of stocks is the actual holdings 
of funds as of the end of the quarter. Filling portfolio weights forward partially addresses the 
problem of “window dressing” in 13F reports (Agarwal, Gay, & Ling, 2014), and can be 
considered a more conservative approach for performance analysis (Coval & Moskowitz, 2001).  
Next, I calculate monthly returns of each distance portfolio for each fund in the sample. I 
notice that some funds do not have local portfolios as defined above. In order to avoid the bias in 
the database and to better address the question of comparison of local and distant returns, I 
exclude from the analysis fund-month observations where a fund does not have either local or 
distant portfolio holdings.  
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I report average annualized returns in Table 11. Monthly returns are multiplied by twelve 
and are averaged using equal weights and weighted by Portfolio size. To further explore 
difference in performance I report local and distant portfolio returns for various quintiles of local 
portfolio weights in the total Portfolio of a hedge fund.   
 
[Insert Table 11] 
 
Unlike Coval and Moskowitz (2001), I do not find superior performance of local 
portfolios. Moreover, in the period 1999-2005 as well in the full sample 1999-2012 local 
portfolios underperformed distant portfolios on average (using equal fund weights) by 2.59% and 
0.90% respectively. The value weighted average performance was lower for local portfolios by 
2.78% and 1.24% for the respective time periods. These results are statistically significant. As a 
plausible explanation of the difference between my results and those of Coval and Moskowitz, I 
suggest the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) cite 
information asymmetry as the key explanation for better performance of local stocks. 
Apparently, with simultaneous information dissemination, the asymmetry may have disappeared. 
In such case, lower returns for local portfolios can be explained by introduction of additional risk 
associated with high geographical concentration of local portfolios.  
In order to assess risk adjusted performance difference in local and distant portfolios, I 
calculate Alphas by fitting the data into linear factor models, namely the CAPM , Fama and 
French (1993) , and Carhart (1997) 6. The factor models have the form of: 
                                                 
6 I obtain factors for Fama and French, and Carhart models from Kenneth R. French website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 =  𝛾 +  ∑ 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 + 𝜀𝑖                                                      (9) 
The inputs for the regression models are monthly returns of local and distant portfolios 
averaged across funds using equal weights and weighted by fund Portfolios. I calculate monthly 
Alpha as an intercept term of the respective regression, and annualize it multiplying by 12. The 
results are presented in Table 12. Generally, local portfolios underperform distant portfolios also 
in terms of risk-adjusted returns, Alphas. The notable exception is risk-adjusted performance in 
2006-2012, where local Portfolios overperform distant ones, and the difference in Alphas is 
statistically significant for Fama and French, and Carhart models. This may suggest that later in 
this decade smaller funds were able to extract valuable information on local companies better 
than larger funds. It also corresponds to the numerous findings in academic literature suggesting 
superior risk-adjusted performance of smaller funds compared to larger ones. 
[Insert Table 12] 
 
IV.7 Origins of local bias 
I consider several plausible explanations for the existence of the observed local bias. 
These hypotheses can be divided into two groups: endogenous factors and information 
asymmetry.  
I argue that endogeneity of local bias can manifest itself in the decision to open a hedge 
fund in a particular location close to an industrial cluster in which the hedge fund specializes. 
The geographical distribution of industries in the U.S. (e.g. Swann and Prevezer (1996))  makes 
this hypothesis plausible from practical point of view. For example, tech companies tend to have 
campuses in California, and more specifically in San Francisco area; large financial institutions 
are headquartered in the state of New York, etc. Hedge funds that specialize in certain industries 
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may choose to open offices closer to the clusters of companies, operating in their focus 
industries. This choice may come from the easier access to talent, specializing in certain 
industries, or from easier access to financial resources that may also be industry specific, e.g. 
when investors into hedge funds have preferences with regard to industry focus of funds they 
invest into. There are some anecdotal examples that illustrate the hypothesis of industrial focus 
as a determinant of funds location. Artis Capital Management, a San Francisco-based hedge 
funds, focused on investments in tech sector. The proximity to portfolio companies allowed the 
fund to gain access to material information. It backfired in 2016 when the fund was charged with 
relation to insider trading and settled the case paying over $9 million in fines and penalties. 
However, anecdotal example, although shaping the “common wisdom”, cannot be use as a proof 
of the hypothesis. To assess the plausibility of this hypothesis, I perform the analysis of 
industrial attribution of hedge fund holdings. I select three states: New York, California, and 
Texas. First, these are the states with the large presence of hedge funds. In fact, in my sample, 
New York and California are the two largest contributors of the hedge fund information. Also, 
all three states are often perceived as states with pronounced industry clustering. New York is 
known for strong financial sector, California is famous for hosting the largest IT and biotech 
companies, and Texas is associated with the oil and gas industry. Table 13 reports 5 largest 
industries based on SIC major industry codes and on the data of entire CRSP stock universe for 
the period 1999-2012. The largest industries in these selected states correspond well to the 
common belief about industrial clustering in the U.S. 
 
[Insert Table 13] 
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 However, when I analyze the industrial attribution of hedge fund holdings by calculating 
portfolio weighted average stock weights of certain industries (Table 14), I conclude that New 
York-based funds do not exhibit industry focus corresponding to the industry clustering in the 
state. Financials are not among the top-5 industries by the portfolio weights of the funds based in 
the state of New York. Conversely, California-based funds invest heavily in electronics and 
computer equipment industries. Also, Texas-based funds have pipelines and oil & gas industries 
among the top-5 industries of portfolio investments. Therefore, the hypothesis of endogenous 
nature of local bias, caused by choosing the location of a hedge fund in proximity to industry 
clusters, may be valid for states other than New York.  
 
[Insert Table 14]   
 
   Information asymmetry is often cited as an explanation of home and local bias. I argue 
that we should distinguish between perceived and actual information asymmetry. Hedge fund 
managers may perceive having an informational advantage about the local companies. Although 
Regulation Fair Disclosure of August 2000 requires simultaneous dissemination of material 
information by publicly traded companies to all investors, local investors may feel that they 
possess non-material (soft) information that gives them an edge over non-local investors. Local 
investors often share the same social circles with top-management of large local companies. The 
direct access to top-management in formal and informal settings may create a sense of 
possession of unique insights into the company’s state of affairs.     
My analysis of difference in raw and risk-adjusted performance between local and distant 
portfolios suggests that in the sample period, hedge funds were unable to capitalize on local 
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stocks. This may serve as evidence that informational advantage is generally not present for local 
hedge funds. 
The aforementioned informational advantage can also be perceived, i.e. hedge fund 
managers believe that they have access to important “soft” information that gives them an 
investment edge. The test of this hypothesis cannot be performed using available information on 
stock holdings by hedge funds.  
Further research, including qualitative studies of hedge fund investment decision-making, 
may shed more light on the origins of local bias.  
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V DISCUSSIONS 
V.1 Contributions 
This paper contributes both to the academic body of knowledge and to business practice 
is several meaningful ways. First, it adds to the findings of Coval and Moskowitz (1999) with 
some notable differences. Coval and Moskowitz performed their analysis using a cross-sectional 
data from 1999. I argue that local bias changes depending on current legislative and economic 
conditions. I use longitudinal data from 1999-2012 and find that local bias, measured using 
Coval and Moskowitz approach fluctuated significantly. More specifically, the level of local bias 
dropped following 2000, which may be explained either by the change in market conditions (the 
dot-com crash of 2000), or by the change of the legislation (introduction of Regulation Fair 
Disclosure, Reg FD). Also, even despite the fact that Coval and Moskowitz (1999) distance 
measure underestimates larger distances, the results of my analysis using more correct distance 
measure shows that the effect of distance is much lower than it was reported for mutual funds. It 
may be the result of introduction of Reg FD and subsequent loss of attractiveness of local 
investments as a source of informational advantage. It also can be expected due to the nature of 
hedge funds. Unlike mutual funds, hedge fund can express their investment view by using short 
selling and financial derivatives. From this point of view, the fact that I find local bias by 
analyzing just long equity portfolios of hedge funds may be viewed as the most conservative 
approach and provide evidence that local bias actually exists among hedge funds. 
Another academic contribution comes from development of alternative models for 
evaluation of local bias. I propose linear and piecewise regressions that describe the divergence 
of stock weights in hedge fund portfolios from mean weights in hedge fund industry. Coupled 
with relative distance measure, the models allow analysis of local bias in relative rather than 
absolute terms. 
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Finally, my research contributes to the conversation on effect of the local bias on 
performance, and through it, to the argument about presence or absence of information 
asymmetry that can be capitalized on by local hedge funds. Since publication of the seminal 
work by Coval and Moskowitz (2001), regulations and market conditions changed significantly 
to eliminate information asymmetry as a source of excess profit.   
From a practical point of view, the research on local bias among hedge funds may be of 
use for investors in hedge funds. Local bias leads to concentration of risks on geographical level, 
which may lead to contagion of geography specific adverse events among local hedge funds. 
Coupled with documented local bias among funds of hedge funds such an event may send shock 
through the whole alternative finance sector in the area. This additional risk is not compensated 
for by higher returns. I do not find any positive difference between local and distant portfolio 
performance. Moreover, in some time periods local portfolios strongly underperform distant 
ones.  
Some investors in hedge fund may have concentrated geographic risks on the liabilities 
side of their balance sheet. An example of such concentration is portfolios of regional pension 
funds investing for local work force, e.g. Teachers’ Retirement System of Georgia (TRSG) that 
manages retirement funds for school and higher degree educators. Investments into alternative 
assets, such as hedge funds, may look as an appealing instrument of risk diversification. 
However, the liabilities of TRSG depend on the level of school system financing, which in turn 
is dependent on economic conditions in the region. Investing with funds that exhibit strong local 
bias will concentrate geographical risk on the asset side of TRSG. Therefore, considering local 
bias when making asset allocation decisions will allow investors like TRSG to avoid risk 
concentration that is not compensated with higher returns. 
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V.2  Limitations and future research 
The key limitation of my research arises from the specifics of hedge fund reporting under 
Section 13-F. Hedge funds use a wide range of financial instruments to express their investment 
views. Arguably, information asymmetry is more likely to manifest itself in case of negative 
rather than positive information. Companies are willing to report to the investment public good 
news. However bad news is likely to be shared reluctantly. The proximity to a company may 
allow obtaining “soft” information valuable to piece together adverse information about the 
company (“mosaic theory”). If information on the structure of short selling by hedge funds as 
well as information with detailed derivative position becomes available for academia, future 
research will be able to analyze local bias not only from long equity positions, but also from 
other sources of return.  
Absence of detailed information on derivative holdings also distorts the picture of local 
bias in long equity portfolios. Funds may use some long equity positions not as an independent 
source of return, but as a hedge against adverse outcomes of derivative positions or as a part of 
complex derivative strategies, e.g. covered put or synthetic option positions. An ability to 
differentiate between pure long positions and positions related to derivatives would improve the 
correctness of the analysis of local bias. However, under current disclosure requirements, such 
information is not available. 
Thirdly, disclosure of holdings under Section 13-F is required on management company 
level. Therefore, for funds pursuing multiple investment strategies or funds that besides hedge 
fund business have a substantial part of operations in other asset management businesses, 
researchers cannot accurately perform the analysis of the effect of funds strategies on local bias. 
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Although, it may be expected that equity funds have stronger local bias than, for instance, 
convertible arbitrage hedge funds. 
Finally, local bias relates to a decision-making process in hedge funds. Although we can 
suggest hypotheses about the origins of the local bias, some of these hypotheses lay in the realm 
of behavioral finance. The hypothesis of endogeneity of hedge fund location selection and the 
hypothesis of perceived informational advantage are examples of such behavioral context. I 
suggested some ways to assess plausibility of these hypotheses. However, future research, 
perhaps qualitative or experimental in nature, is needed to explore local bias as a cognitive or an 
emotional type.  
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VI CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I explore local bias among U.S.-based hedge funds. I find that local bias is 
present among hedge funds, although at lower level than it was reported in mutual fund domain. 
I also show that the size of a company and the level of leverage are determinants of local bias, 
with smaller and more levered companies representing more proximate part of hedge fund 
portfolios. 
I also suggest an alternative measure based on stock weights in portfolios of hedge funds 
and distance between hedge funds and portfolio companies, where both weights and distance are 
measured in relative terms to the mean weight and distance of the same stock as relates to other 
hedge funds. I show that using these relative measures, we can model local bias through linear 
and piecewise regression. Also through the sorting analysis, I provide evidence of strong relative 
preference among hedge funds for local companies (closer than 100km). 
Finally, I explore the effect of local bias on portfolio performance and find that local 
portfolios on average do not deliver better raw or risk-adjusted returns than distant portfolios. 
Moreover, in some instances the performance of local portfolios is lower than the performance of 
distant portfolios. These findings allow me to conclude, that the hypothesis of better access to 
company information from a local hedge fund is unlikely to hold.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: On distance measure 
 
Coval and Moskowitz (1999) report the following formula for calculation of the distance 
between a mutual fund and a portfolio company: 
𝑑𝑖,𝑗 = arccos {cos(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖) cos(𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑖) cos(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑗) cos(𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑗) 
+ cos(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖) sin(𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑖) cos(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑗) sin(𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑗) 
+ sin(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖) sin(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑗)}2𝜋𝑟/360 
 
I argue that the aforementioned formula does not take into account the spherical shape of 
the Earth. As the result, short distances are calculated fairly accurately, while longer distances 
are estimated incorrectly. 
 In my paper, I use the formula from Alam et al. (2014) that relies on spherical law of 
cosines, and is expressed as: 
𝑑𝑖,𝑗  =  𝑟 × arccos  [sin(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖) sin(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑗) + cos(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖) cos(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑗) cos(𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑖 − 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑗)]  
 
Table A1 shows the result of application of spherical law formula (Column 9) and Coval 
and Moskowitz formula (Column 10) on three randomly chosen pairs of coordinates. As a 
benchmark (Column 11), I use the distance between these coordinates reported on the National 
Hurricane Center website7. 
[Insert Table A1] 
 
                                                 
7 http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/gccalc.shtml 
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Appendix B: A sense of distance 
 
In order to assess the reasonability of the chosen distance group,  I obtain characteristic of 
administrative units from U.S. Census Bureau8. To better visualize the areas, I report the radius 
of a circle that has the same area as administrative units.  
The chosen measure of locality (100km) approximately corresponds to 3-4 counties in the 
U.S. The cut-offs for distance groups (500 and 1,000km) can be compared to the areas of 2 and 4 
“average” states, respectively. 
[Insert Table A2] 
  
                                                 
8 https://www.census.gov/support/USACdataDownloads.html 
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Appendix C: Tables and Figures 
Figure 1:Geographical distribution of the sample 
On this figure, red dots represent geography of hedge funds in the sample. Blue dots – geography of their portfolio 
companies. X- and Y- axes represent longitude and latitude respectively. 
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Figure 2: Dynamics of the local bias 
This figure shows dynamics of Local Bias measures in percent. The averaging is performed as in Equal-Value case 
of Table 3. 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
40 
Figure 3: GAM model 
This figure shows the results of fitting of generalized additive model (GAM). Solid line represents the fitted results. 
Dashed lines depict 95% confidence interval.  
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Table 1: Geographical distribution of the sample 
This table reports number of hedge funds for each state in the sample. In total, the sample includes quarterly 
observations for 1,166 funds in the period between 1999 and 2012. 
 
State 
N of 
funds 
New York 505 
California 169 
Connecticut 106 
Massachusetts 76 
Texas 48 
Illinois 46 
Pennsylvania 27 
Florida 26 
New Jersey 26 
Minnesota 18 
Virginia 15 
Washington 13 
Georgia 11 
Colorado 9 
Maryland 9 
North Carolina 9 
Ohio 9 
Tennessee 6 
Wisconsin 5 
Nebraska 4 
Delaware 3 
Michigan 3 
South Dakota 3 
 
State N of funds 
Alabama 2 
Arizona 2 
Arkansas 2 
Indiana 2 
Kansas 2 
Nevada 2 
New Mexico 2 
Oklahoma 2 
South Carolina 2 
Utah 2 
Iowa 1 
Kentucky 1 
Mississippi 1 
Oregon 1 
Rhode Island 1 
Vermont 1 
Total 1,172 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
This table shows the summary statistics for the key variables used in the analysis. The sample period is from first 
quarter of 1999 to fourth quarter 2012. The portfolio holdings in the sample include confidential filings. Distance is a 
distance in hundreds of kilometers between the office of a hedge fund and the headquarter of a corresponding portfolio 
company. Market Distance is distance in hundreds of kilometers to all equities in CRSP database, weighted by market 
capitalization. Portfolio is the sum of values of all long stock positions of a fund as of the end of the quarter.  Weight 
is the percentage of a long stock portfolio allocated by fund f to the shares of company i in a given quarter of 13-F 
Filing. Weight excl. is weight of stock i in portfolios of funds other than fund f. Delta weight is the difference between 
Weight and Weight excl. Return is the total quarterly return of stock i for quarter t.   Market Cap is a market 
capitalization of portfolio company i as of the end of quarter t-1. Size is a natural logarithm of Market Cap. Book-to-
Market is the ratio of book value of common equity per share to Price. Momentum is a cumulative return for four 
quarters preceding the quarter of observation. Leverage is a ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  Return, Book-to-
Market, and Momentum are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Distance, LB, Portfolio, and Weight minimum values that 
appear as zero are the results of rounding. Actual minimum values are small, but differ from zero.   
 
 
  N Mean Median St. dev Min Max 
Distance measure 
('00 km)       
Distance, D if 2,692,612 18.144 15.252 13.802 0.000 44.571 
Market distance, DMf,t 2,692,612 18.330 17.115 4.321 12.164 29.774 
 
      
Portfolio size (mln $)       
Portfolio t  2,704,047 5,143.042 937.176 11,272.994 0.000 89,605.436 
 
      
Local bias       
LB if,t 2,692,612 -0.759 -0.044 3.633 -287.086 9.754 
 
      
Weights ,%       
Weight, W if,t 2,692,612 0.904 0.151 2.973 0.000 100.000 
Weight excl., W ixf,t 2,692,612 0.897 0.663 1.103 0.000 100.000 
Delta weight, ΔW if,t 2,692,612 0.007 -0.297 3.035 -100.000 100.000 
       
Portfolio investments       
Return it (%) 2,679,017 3.583 2.813 22.973 -56.360 88.889 
Market Cap it (mln $) 2,548,838 18,296.668 2,662.355 46,485.425 0.281 626,550.353 
Size it 2,548,838 7.975 7.887 2.024 -1.270 13.348 
Book-to-Market it 2,646,677 0.553 0.449 0.453 -0.271 2.599 
Momentum it 2,598,194 17.760 9.730 56.970 -79.575 295.496 
Leverage it 2,678,033 0.566 0.561 0.283 0.000 37.308 
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Table 3: Test of local equity preference 
This table reports the results of test of local equity preference for 1,172 hedge funds for the period 1999-2012. 
Distance measures are averaged on fund level using Equal weights, or weighted by the size of the long equity 
portfolio (Value). On portfolio firm levels the distances are averaged using Equal weight, or weighted by market 
capitalization of a company (Value).  Distances and difference in distances (Diff.) are measured in kilometers. Local 
Bias, % is calculated as Diff/Distance to Holding. Last column reports t-statistics for difference in means between 
distance to Holding and Distance to Market. The table reports results for the full sample of funds and for the sub-
sample excluding funds based in the state of New York. 
 
Weights  Avg. Distance to   
Diff. 
  Local 
Bias, 
% 
  
t-stat Funds - Firms Holding Market       
All States         
Equal-Equal 1,766.31 1,807.46  41.15  2.33  8.22 
Equal-Value 1,766.31 1,833.61  67.30  3.81  13.66 
Value-Equal 1,709.65 1,729.80  20.15  1.18  23.49 
Value-Value 1,709.65 1,774.10  64.45  3.77  30.45 
Excluding NY         
Equal-Equal 1,875.78 1,956.52  80.74  4.30  11.59 
Equal-Value 1,875.78 1,968.24  92.46  4.93  13.57 
Value-Equal 1,805.83 1,845.77  39.94  2.21  24.53 
Value-Value 1,805.83 1,876.63   70.80   3.92   27.19 
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Table 4: Size and leverage as determinants of local bias 
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates and standard errors (clustered by stock-fund and quarter) using 𝐿𝐵𝑓,,𝑡
𝑖  as 
the dependent variable, using quarterly observations. The sample period is from first quarter of 1999 to fourth 
quarter 2012. Size is a natural logarithm of Market Capitalization. Leverage is a ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets. 
Figures marked with ***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
  All States NY Excl. NY 
Sizeit -0.0110*** -0.0421*** 0.0025 
 (0.0021) (0.0035) (0.0020) 
Leverageit 0.1084*** 0.1555*** 0.0773*** 
  (0.0095)  (0.0167)  (0.0097) 
LBif,t-1 0.8316*** 0.8306*** 0.8311*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0181) (0.0117) 
Constant -0.2267*** -0.0855*** -0.2794*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0214) (0.0200) 
R2 0.5323 0.5254 0.5402 
N 2,554,544 946,442 1,608,102 
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Table 5: Sorting analysis of local bias 
This table reports arithmetic Mean Δ𝑊𝑓,𝑡
𝑖  grouped and sorted by distance quintiles. The outer bounds of the 
quintiles are inclusive, the inner bounds, except for zero, are exclusive. 
 
Distance groups 
Mean 
ΔWif,t 
0 - 100 km 0.160 
100 - 500 km 0.031 
500 - 1,000 km 0.004 
> 1,000 km -0.019 
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Table 6: ANOVA test of difference in means 
This table reports the results of ANOVA test of differences in means of Delta Weight among different Distance 
groups. Figures marked with ***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
  Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value p-value 
Distance groups 
                          
3  
                   
7,534  
        
2,511  
            
273  0.0000***  
Residuals 
         
2,692,608  
         
24,800,107  
             
9.2      
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Table 7: Tukey HSD test 
This table reports the results of Tukey HSD test. Distance groups are presented in kilometers. Standard errors are 
clustered at stock-fund and quarter levels. Outer bounds of distance intervals are inclusive, while inner bounds are 
exclusive.     
Figures marked with ***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Distance groups Mean diff. St. Error adj. p-value 
[100-500 km ] - [0 - 100 km] -0.1290 *** 0.0277 0.0000  
[500-1,000 km ] - [0 - 100 km] -0.1556 *** 0.0291 0.0000  
[1,000-4,500 km ] - [0 - 100 km] -0.1791 *** 0.0243 0.0000  
[500-1,000 km ] - [100 - 500 km] -0.0266  0.0204            0.1928  
[1,000-4,500 km ] - [100 - 500 km] -0.0501 *** 0.0157 0.0014  
[1,000-4,500 km ] - [500 - 1,000 km] -0.0236   0.0166            0.1563  
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Table 8: Stock weight divergence and distance between hedge funds and portfolio 
companies 
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates and standard errors (clustered by stock-fund and quarter) using 
𝛥𝑊𝑓,,𝑡
𝑖  as the dependent variable, using quarterly observations. The sample period is from first quarter of 1999 to 
fourth quarter 2012. Log (Dif,t/ Dixf,t) is a natural logarithm of the ratio of Distance between fund f and company i to 
the mean Distance between all other funds in the sample holding this stock and company i . Size is a natural 
logarithm of market capitalization of a portfolio company. BM is Book-to-Market ratio of a portfolio company. 
Momentum is the compounded return of the stock for the four quarters preceding the quarter of observation. 
Column 1 reports the results for the full sample. Column 2 presents the results for a sub-sample of 1,000 largest 
stocks in CRSP database in each quarter. 
Figures marked with ***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
  Full Sample 1,000 stocks 
 (1) (2) 
Log (Dif,t/Dixf,t) -0.0129*** -0.0134*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0013) 
Sizeit 0.0068*** 0.0028** 
 (0.0009) (0.0014) 
BMit 0.0117*** 0.0121*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0041) 
Momentumit -0.0108*** -0.0106** 
 (0.0032) -0.0044 
ΔWif,t-1 0.8271*** 0.8273*** 
 (0.0091) (0.0093) 
Constant -0.0599*** -0.0211 
 (0.0091) (0.0143) 
R2 0.5395 0.5316 
N 2,411,829 1,451,664 
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Table 9: Stock weight divergence and distance between hedge funds and portfolio 
companies (Portfolio size sub-samples) 
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates and standard errors (clustered by stock-fund and quarter) using 
𝛥𝑊𝑓,,𝑡
𝑖  as the dependent variable, using quarterly observations. The sample period is from first quarter of 1999 to 
fourth quarter 2012. Log (Dif,t/ Dixf,t) is a natural logarithm of the ratio of Distance between fund f and company i to 
the mean Distance between all other funds in the sample holding this stock and company i . Size is a natural 
logarithm of market capitalization of a portfolio company. BM is Book-to-Market ratio of a portfolio company. 
Momentum is the compounded return of the stock for the four quarters preceding the quarter of observation. 
Column 1 reports the results for the sub-sample of Portfolios larger than the median Portfolio in the quarter of 
observation. Column 2 presents the results for a sub-sample of Portfolios equal or below the median. 
Figures marked with ***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
  
Portfolio above 
median 
Portfolio equal 
or below 
median 
 (1) (2) 
Log (Dif,t/Dixf,t) -0.0060*** -0.0256*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0024) 
Sizeit 0.0080*** -0.0073*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0017) 
BMit 0.0262*** -0.0019 
 (0.0049) (0.0058) 
Momentumit -0.0029) -0.0119 
 (0.0052) -0.0077 
ΔWif,t-1 0.7543*** 0.8328*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0093) 
Constant -0.2350*** 0.1895*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0178) 
R2 0.5500 0.5293 
N 1,200,335 1,211,494 
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Table 10: Piecewise linear regression 
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates and standard errors (clustered by stock-fund and quarter) of the 
piecewise linear regression using 𝛥𝑊𝑓,,𝑡
𝑖  as the dependent variable, using quarterly observations. The break point for 
the regression is set at Log (Dif,t/ Dixf,t) =0.The sample period is from first quarter of 1999 to fourth quarter 2012. Log 
(Dif,t/ Dixf,t) is a natural logarithm of the ratio of Distance between fund f and company i to the mean Distance 
between all other funds in the sample holding this stock and company i . Size is a natural logarithm of market 
capitalization of a portfolio company. BM is Book-to-Market ratio of a portfolio company. Momentum is the 
compounded return of the stock for the four quarters preceding the quarter of observation. 
Column 1 reports the results for the full sample. Column 2 presents the results for a sub-sample of 1,000 largest 
stocks in CRSP database in each quarter. 
Figures marked with ***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 Full Sample 1,000 stocks 
  (1) (2) 
Log (Dif,t/Dixf,t) ≤ 0 -0.0104*** -0.0105*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0014) 
Change in slope Log (Dif,t/Dixf,t) >  0 -0.0185*** -0.0272*** 
 (0.0062) (0.0084) 
Sizeit 0.0068*** 0.0031** 
 (0.0009) (0.0014) 
BMit 0.0118*** 0.0122*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0041) 
Momentumit -0.0108*** -0.0107** 
 (0.0032) (0.0044) 
Lag ΔWif,t 0.8271*** 0.8273*** 
 (0.0091) (0.0094) 
Constant -0.0549*** -0.0166 
 (0.0090) (0.0144) 
R2 0.5395 0.5316 
N 2,411,829 1,451,664 
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Table 11: Raw returns of Local and Distant portfolios (annualized) 
This table reports average annualized raw returns of Local and Distant portfolios, as well as the appropriate t-statistics. The cut-off for locality definition is set at 
100km. The analysis results for separate funds are averaged using equal weights (Equal) and Portfolio size (Value).  Quintiles are quintiles of weight of local 
portfolios. Quintile ranges are expressed in percentages of total Portfolio. The results are reported for 1999-2005 and 2006-2012 sub-samples, as well as for the 
full sample 1999-2012. 
Panel A. Equal weights  
Local 
portfolio 
quintiles 
Quintile 
range, 1999-2005   2006-2012   1999-2012 
% of 
Portfolio RLocal RDistant Diff t-stat   RLocal RDistant Diff t-stat   RLocal RDistant Diff t-stat 
Q1 [0.0, 3.55] 6.725 7.015 -0.290 0.138  4.854 3.357 1.497 0.908  5.578 4.772 0.806 0.622 
Q2 (3.55, 8.28] 8.635 10.313 -1.678 0.876  4.238 5.557 -1.319 0.894  5.852 7.303 -1.451 1.240 
Q3 (8.28, 14.4] 9.519 11.279 -1.760 0.968  6.915 7.226 -0.311 0.228  7.859 8.695 -0.836 0.767 
Q4 (14.4, 22.7] 6.371 11.445 -5.074 2.997  6.669 7.213 -0.543 0.418  6.566 8.679 -2.113 2.047 
Q5 (22.7, 99.2] 2.942 7.429 -4.487 2.162  9.046 7.996 1.050 0.719  6.905 7.797 -0.892 0.746 
ALL   6.871 9.461 -2.590 2.993   6.370 6.304 0.067 0.103   6.552 7.449 -0.897 1.728 
 
Panel B. Value weighted 
Local 
portfolio 
quintiles 
Quintile 
range, 1999-2005   2006-2012   1999-2012 
% of 
Portfolio RLocal RDistant Diff t-stat   RLocal RDistant Diff t-stat   RLocal RDistant Diff t-stat 
Q1 [0.00, 3.55] 6.982 4.263 2.719 1.455  6.983 3.697 3.285 2.390  6.983 3.869 3.114 2.823 
Q2 (3.55, 8.28] 6.572 6.211 0.360 0.214  0.059 2.743 -2.684 2.162  2.085 3.822 -1.737 1.741 
Q3 (8.28, 14.4] 4.136 9.686 -5.550 3.462  4.401 4.218 0.182 0.150  4.305 6.195 -1.890 1.950 
Q4 (14.4, 22.7] 3.405 8.880 -5.476 3.861  4.047 4.363 -0.315 0.300  3.891 5.458 -1.567 1.851 
Q5 (22.7, 99.2] 0.090 6.166 -6.076 3.616  2.502 6.090 -3.588 3.014  1.714 6.115 -4.400 4.531 
ALL   4.409 7.187 -2.778 3.764   3.522 4.104 -0.582 1.083   3.790 5.034 -1.244 2.870 
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Table 12: Risk adjusted returns of Local and Distant portfolios (annualized) 
This table reports average annualized Alphas of Local and Distant portfolios, as well as the appropriate t-statistics. The cut-off for locality definition is set at 
100km. The analysis results for separate funds are averaged using equal weights (Equal) and Portfolio size (Value). Quintiles are quintiles of weight of local 
portfolios. Quintile ranges are expressed in percentages of total Portfolio. Alphas are intercepts of respective factor models: the CAPM, Fama and French (FF), 
and Carhart. The results are reported for 1999-2005 and 2006-2012 sub-samples, as well as for the full sample 1999-2012. 
 
Panel A. Equal weights  
Factor 1999-2005   2006-2012   1999-2012 
Model AlphaL AlphaD Diff t-stat   AlphaL AlphaD Diff t-stat   AlphaL AlphaD Diff t-stat 
CAPM 2.981 5.137 -2.156 2.457  0.696 0.504 0.192 0.302  1.828 2.856 -1.028 1.886 
FF -0.324 0.577 -0.901 4.094  0.421 0.002 0.419 1.915  0.527 1.022 -0.495 4.916 
Carhart 0.356 0.776 -0.420 3.690   0.353 -0.019 0.371 2.042   0.831 1.085 -0.254 4.619 
 
Panel B. Value weighted 
Factor 1999-2005   2006-2012   1999-2012 
Model AlphaL AlphaD Diff t-stat   AlphaL AlphaD Diff t-stat   AlphaL AlphaD Diff t-stat 
CAPM 1.487 3.768 -2.280 2.114  0.936 1.230 -0.294 0.357  1.253 2.541 -1.288 1.904 
FF -1.232 -0.577 -0.655 3.098  0.767 0.822 -0.055 2.070  0.311 1.121 -0.811 4.414 
Carhart -0.766 -0.710 -0.056 2.660   0.716 0.814 -0.098 2.149   0.515 1.061 -0.546 4.120 
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Table 13: Industrial clustering in states 
This table reports the results of the industrial analysis of the investment universe in the states of New York, California and Texas in 1999-2012. The table 
presents the number of tradable companies in certain sectors based on CRSP universe. The percentage of companies is calculated as number of companies in 
certain sector divided by the total number of tradable companies located in the state.  
New York   California   Texas 
Industry # of 
companies 
% of 
companies 
  Industry # of 
companies 
% of 
companies 
  Industry # of 
companies 
% of 
companies 
Holding & 
Other 
Investment 
Offices 
303 28.64 
 
Business 
Services 
345 20.27 
 
Oil & Gas 
Extraction 
158 17.03 
Business 
Services 
119 11.25 
 
Electronic & 
Other 
Electrical 
Equipment 
205 12.04 
 
Business 
Services 
84 9.05 
Depository 
Institutions 
73 6.90 
 
Chemicals & 
Allied 
Products 
173 10.16 
 
Holding & 
Other 
Investment 
Offices 
70 7.54 
Security & 
Commodity 
Brokers, 
Dealers, 
Exchanges, 
etc. 
60 5.67 
 
Measuring, 
Analyzing, 
& 
Controlling 
Instruments 
148 8.70 
 
Electric, 
Gas, & 
Sanitary 
Services 
43 4.63 
Chemicals & 
Allied 
Products 
56 5.29   Holding & 
Other 
Investment 
Offices 
110 6.46   Chemicals 
& Allied 
Products 
41 4.42 
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Table 14: Industrial clustering among hedge funds 
This table reports the results of the industrial analysis of the actual portfolio holdings of hedge funds in the states of New York, California and Texas in 1999-
2012. The table reports total allocation of long equity portfolios of hedge funds to a certain industry. The weight of an industry in a hedge fund portfolio is 
averaged across all reporting quarters and all funds using weighted average with portfolio sized as weights.   
 
New York   California   Texas 
Industry   Avg. 
portfoli
o 
weight 
  Industry   Avg. 
portfoli
o weight 
  Industry   Avg. 
portfolio 
weight 
Chemicals & Allied 
Products  
10.98 
 
Business Services 
 
11.69 
 
Business Services 
 
9.82 
Business Services 
 
10.49 
 
Chemicals & Allied Products 
 
10.30 
 
Electronic & Other 
Electrical Equipment 
& Components, 
Except Computer 
Equipment  
8.77 
Communications 
 
7.15 
 
Electronic & Other Electrical 
Equipment & Components, 
Except Computer Equipment  
8.77 
 
Chemicals & Allied 
Products 
 
8.23 
Electronic & Other 
Electrical Equipment 
& Components, 
Except Computer 
Equipment 
 
6.42 
 
Communications 
 
7.56 
 
Pipelines, Except 
Natural Gas 
 
8.14 
Oil & Gas Extraction 
  
6.17   Industrial & Commercial 
Machinery & Computer 
Equipment   
6.75   Oil & Gas Extraction 
  
7.92 
 
  
  
 
 
55 
Table A1: Comparison of distance measures 
This table reports various distance measures calculated for selected pairs of hedge funds and portfolio companies. The pairs were randomly chosen among three 
groups: long distance (over 1,000 km), medium (between 100 and 500 km), short distance (below 100 km). Distance measures are calculated using spherical law 
of cosines (Distance SL), and Coval and Moskowitz (1999) formula (Distance CM). As a benchmark, I report distance obtained from National Hurricane Center. 
All distances are reported in kilometers. 
 
Fund name Fund 
state 
Fund 
 lon 
Fund 
lat 
 
Company Company 
state 
Company 
lon 
Company 
lat 
 
Distance 
SL 
Distance 
CM 
Distance 
NHC 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) 
Southeastern 
Asset Mgmnt 
TN -89.8497 35.1014 Scott 
Technologies 
OH -81.5089 41.4644 1,015 177 1,014 
Zimmer Lucas 
Partners 
NY -73.9807 40.7653 
 
Allegheny 
Energy 
PA -79.4398 40.3602 
 
464 98 463 
Artis Capital CA -122.4088 37.7835   Apple Inc. CA -122.0449 37.3180 
 
61 65 61 
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Table A2: Areas of administrative units 
This table reports Mean, Min and Max area of states and counties in the U.S. The data are provided 
including and excluding administrative units located in Alaska. Radius is a radius of a circle that will have the same 
are as Mean, Min, and Max areas of administrative units respectively. 
  N Area, sq.km   Radius, km 
   Mean Min Max   Mean Min Max 
States 51 192,267.52 176.98 1,699,482.10  247.39 7.51 735.50 
States excl. AK 50 162,123.23 176.98 695,407.89  227.17 7.51 470.48 
         
Counties 3,146 78,715.57 2,591.59 145,100.51  158.29 28.72 214.91 
Counties excl. AK 3,116 2,600.63 4.74 52,055.44   28.77 1.23 128.72 
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